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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
In considering how society generally is regulated, most times focus is always on 
Acts of Parliament that are passed by the legislative arm of government. 
However, there is another aspect of law making that is of immense importance 
for the regulation of any given society. This is especially so with the fact that Acts 
of Parliament are becoming less detailed and relying more on delegated 
legislation to make them comprehensive enough to be workable pieces of 
legislation. Delegated legislation which are laws made by the executive or other 
administrative bodies is a huge part of any legal system as it forms part of the 
wider legislative process that is used for the regulation of any given society.    
 
Modern society imposes on government social, cultural and economic matters of 
human endeavours 1 and the government needs to provide legislations to regulate 
these activities, but legislation in these areas is so enormous that it is impossible 
for the legislature to legislate in details to cover all these matters. Thus the grant 
of rule-making power by the legislature to the executive became a necessity and 
a permanent feature in modern society.2 Though considered as an infringement 
on the doctrine of separation of power,3 the need for such legislation is obvious 
because parliament lacks the time and the resources to legislate 
comprehensively.4 Therefore, broad areas of laws which require significant 
amount of details are left to this form of law making, in order to make their 
principles workable5 and this could include any aspect of the society.  
                                                          
1 Joel Olasunkanmi Anwo & Lawal Bosede Sabitiyu, ‘Principles of Administrative Law’, Nigerian Open 
University, (2012), 41. 
2 K C Wheare, ‘Controlling Delegated Legislation: A British Experiment, The Journal of Politics Vol. 11 No 4 
1949 748. 
3 H W R Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford Clarendon Press 1967, 291. 
4 Beatson, Matthews and Elliot’s, Administrative Law Text & Materials, Third edn, Oxford University Press 
2005, 633.   
5 Ian McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2009, 159 
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This means that the collective force of matters that are dealt with under delegated 
legislation, impacts on all areas of our daily life.6 Therefore, the extent to which 
these powers are delegated and how they are exercised requires careful 
consideration.7 This is because the authority to make rules having statutory effect 
is a power that has its consequences. These rules are no less than statutes and they 
guide the conduct of the citizens and must be obeyed. They have equal force of 
law as the empowering Act.8 Consequently, the need to ensure that they respect 
the limitations in the enabling Act and are subject to the instrument of control of 
both the Parliament and the Judiciary is a necessity.9  
 
Writers have argued that this power should not extend to matters of principle on 
which a decision of parliament ought to be taken.10 Also, the discretion of such 
powers should not be left unchecked. According to Gwyer, an unfettered exercise 
of power is no good for any society.11   Society needs to be focused on how these 
powers are being exercised because these are issues that easily makes the 
regulator a despot.12  
 
At the same time, delegated legislation is considered as a useful process that 
contributes to the overall legislative and regulatory quality. In other to serve its 
purpose and to prevent it from harbouring bad quality legislation, certain 
safeguards needs to be put in place especially by the parliament to ensure that 
these laws when passed will fulfil the purpose for which they are enacted and be 
able to produce the regulatory result by the policy maker.13  
                                                          
6 E C Page, Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy Making, Portland Hart 
Publishing, 2001,141 
7 Helen Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting, fifth edn, Bloomsbury Professional, 2013,  403   
8 D R Miers and A C Page, Legislation, London Sweet and Maxwell 1982, 140 
9 Helen Xanthaki, written evidence to the House of Lords, Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee, Inquiry into delegated Powers Memorandum, 2014, 62   
10 Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting, (n 7), 403 
11 Gwyer, ‘The Power of Public Departments to Make Rules Having the Force of Law’ ,1927, 5 J of Pub 404- 
409 
12 Ojo , Delegated Legislation, ( 1964), 200 Thesis Submitted to Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London 
for the Award of Doctorate Degree,  VLE , accessed  15th July 2014 
13 Helen Xanthaki, The Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is Really Wrong, (2001) VLE   
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They should be laws that enjoy the support and co-operation of all actors in the 
legislative process14 and be able to command the wilful compliance of the citizens 
whose lives they are to regulate. In order for this to happen they have to meet the 
procedural conditions of consultation and publication. Also, they must meet 
general drafting conventions that promote clarity, precision and unambiguity.15 
These are all issues that will promote effectiveness and serve as a criteria for 
quality in parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
 
This dissertation will examine delegated legislation in Nigeria and the challenges 
of its control. The forms of delegated legislation that will be looked at here, are 
those rules, orders, regulations that are made by persons or administrative 
agencies under the legislative authority of the parliament. The study is focused 
on Nigeria, but will reflect on some British analysis for the sole purpose of 
helping us to have a clearer understanding of the concept of delegated legislation 
and how to effectively control this type of legislation. This approach will enable 
us see the gap in the Nigerian system and suggest ways that could improve the 
system in Nigeria. Another reason for this approach is that most of the laws in 
Nigeria are tailored towards the Common law system applicable in the United 
Kingdom as such a discussion of delegated legislation in Nigeria cannot be done 
effectively without a mention of the British common law system.  
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that adequate parliamentary scrutiny 
prevents the harbouring of bad quality delegated legislation. To prove this 
hypothesis, analysis will be done on the system of delegated legislation in Nigeria 
to establish whether these instruments are made under proper authority. Secondly, 
whether the exercise of these powers are in line with the powers conferred by the 
Primary Act and thirdly, whether the mechanism if any that has been put in place 
                                                          
14 Xanthaki, Quality of Legislation (n 13) 
15 Xanthaki, Written evidence (n 9), 64 
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are enough to safeguard them against abuse and prevent the harbouring of bad 
quality legislation, if not, what measures can be taken.  
 
The basis of this research is that Nigeria like most other countries have a mass of 
their laws being exercised by Administrative authorities. The standard is that laws 
should emanate from those who are elected to make them, but in reality, this may 
not always be possible thus the reliance on delegated legislation. Having in mind 
that this type of law making has its own pitfalls, there is need for adequate 
measures to be put in place to prevent the abuse of this exercise of power and to 
ensure that there are certain conditions that can be used as criteria for effective 
control by the parliament. This will serve as a check and safeguard against bad 
quality legislation. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
This dissertation examines available literature on delegated legislation and 
considers why it so easily harbours bad quality legislation. It identifies the root 
cause to be the lack of adequate parliamentary scrutiny. The paper proposes that 
the parliament who are the donors of these powers ought to provide adequate 
scrutiny for delegated legislation and this will be able to safeguard it from 
harbouring poor quality of legislation. 
 
In examining the measures that are put in place it considers the enabling clause 
in the primary Act as a starting point in the parliamentary scrutiny by pointing 
out that it has the role of conveying clearly the policy aim of the Ministerial 
power16 and the narrow limits of the delegation for which the Parliament can 
ensure that the delegation is in compliance with. These can serve as quality 
criteria for effective scrutiny. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 V.R.A.C. Crabbe, ‘Legislative Precedent, Vol. II, London Cavendish Publishing Ltd 1998, 48 
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1.4 Structure 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters with the following breakdown: 
Chapter One deals with the introduction, aims and objective, methodology and 
the structure.  
Chapter Two deals with the definition, overview and what subsidiary legislation 
is about. It looks at the origin, importance and reasons why powers are delegated. 
Finally, the types of subsidiary legislation will be considered. 
Chapter Three is on the justification of delegated legislation looking at time 
pressures on the parliament, the flexibility of the legislative process and the 
technicalities of the subject matter.  
Chapter Four looks at the criticisms of delegated legislation and concludes on 
how lack of scrutiny affects subsidiary legislation and even the primary 
legislation.  
Chapter Five analyses control of subsidiary legislation and the problems 
associated with this type of legislation. Parliamentary scrutiny and its effect on 
subsidiary legislation will be examined. Also, the chapter will consider the effects 
of parliamentary scrutiny on the quality of the legislation. The model in the 
United Kingdom will be considered to draw lessons from it. Furthermore, the 
chapter will talk about the enabling clause as a system of control but its limitations 
will also be pointed out. Finally, other means of control like control by the courts 
and the Executive will be considered.  
Chapter Six is the conclusion and recommendation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Definition and Description of Delegated Legislation 
2.1 What is Delegated Legislation? 
Delegated legislation also called subsidiary legislation or statutory instrument is 
that legislation which is made under a delegated authority.17 It is the exercise of 
power to legislate conferred by or under an Act of Parliament to the Executives 
or other Administrative authorities.18 In the Nigerian context, it may not be easy 
to give a concise definition of what the term delegated legislation means, but 
Section 18 of the Interpretation Act, which gave various definitions of which 
statutory instrument is one, defines it to mean:  
 “any order, rules, regulation, rules of court, bye laws made either before or 
after the commencement of this Act in exercise of powers conferred by an 
Act.”19 
 
From the above definition, it is clear what amounts to delegated legislation in 
Nigeria. The definition states clearly, the various forms that delegated legislation 
may take. The subsidiary bodies that power can be delegated to includes the 
president, governors, ministers, commissioners, Administrative agencies, 
professional bodies etc.20 When carrying out  these powers, these bodies act every 
bit like the parliament and make laws that have the same force as laws made by 
the parliament.21 These legislations derive their legitimacy from Acts of 
Parliament and they can only be made where there is express provision in the 
Primary Legislation to do so.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting(n 7) 523 
18 Report on Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation ,1972 HL 184HC 475 par 6 
19  Interpretation Act 1964 LFN 
20 S O Imhanobe, ‘Delegated Legislation’, Fundamentals of Legislative Drafting, edited by Epiphany Azinge, 
Vivian Madu, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 2012, 196   
21 ibid 
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2.2 Origin of Delegated Legislation  
Delegated legislation is not new, it dates back many centuries.22 An example 
could be seen as far as 1337 in England.23 A substantive part of government 
during this period was run by way of administrative provisions made by 
Sovereign in Council.24 The limits to which their powers can be exercised were 
never defined.25 Later periods saw the emergence of Statutes that gave the King 
in Council the powers to make proclamations which were to have the same force 
as Acts of Parliament.26 However, it was not until parliament asserted their 
powers as the sole agents responsible for law making that the exercise of 
government to make laws was seen as being conferred on them by Parliament.27  
 
By the 19th century there was an increase in the volume of delegated legislations 
that was made. In England alone, there is the record that about three to four 
thousand delegated legislations are passed yearly.28 These legislations, deal with 
several matters ranging from trivial to those which were of supreme importance 
but one thing about most of these kinds of legislation is that they affect the 
everyday life of the citizens as it now forms the bulk of the legislative instrument 
that regulate citizens activities.29 These legislations became necessary in modern 
societies as a result of increased legislative responsibilities of the parliament and 
the consequent impossibility of deciding all issues in primary legislation.30  
 
This situation saw the need for parliament to divide the law making powers with 
the government. In response to this, the principle was formulated that 
                                                          
22 Daniel Greenberg, Craise on Legislation, London Sweet and Maxwell, 2012, 116 
23 Statute for Exportation of Wool, see also Statute of Staple of 1388 
24 Miers and Page ( n 8) 143 
25 Cecil Carr, Delegated Legislation 1921, 51-53 
26 Henry VIII Statute of Proclamation in 1539 
27 Miers and Page (n 8) 143 
28 Greenberg, Craise on Legislation (n 22) 116 
29 Xanthaki, written evidence  (n 9)  
30 Miers and Page (n 8)143 
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parliament’s responsibility was to deal with the form while the government has 
to deal with the details. Amongst the proponents of this was Henry Thring, who 
was of the opinion that parliament’s attention should be confined to material 
provisions only, leaving the details to be settled departmentally by government 
as that is the only way they can carry out their functions effectively.31 Dicey also 
supports this by stating that “the substance and form of law will be improved if 
the executive could work out the detailed applications of Acts of Parliaments.”32  
 
Writers see this as what would help in the drafting of legislation on the whole as 
matters of details will not be included in the legislation and this would lead to the 
improvement in the drafting of legislative text.  
 
2.3 Overview of Delegated Legislation in Nigeria 
Delegated legislation has become a part of the legal system in Nigeria. The 
legislature like in other countries see the need to delegate powers to the executive 
but, there are hardly opportunity for the scrutiny of these legislations by the 
parliament before or after they are passed. Also, unlike other jurisdictions, there 
are no general pattern or procedure that are laid down that can be followed for the 
making of these legislations.33 The procedure to be followed in each particular 
case largely depends on the enabling law and this causes a lot of variations 
between the different regulations that are made and as such the safeguards in 
place are far too meagre to constitute an adequate control of delegated legislation.  
 
Generally, the delegation of law making powers can be traced to the Constitution. 
Section 4(1) and 4(6) vests the legislative powers on the National Assembly and 
the State Houses of Assembly respectively.34 This power to make laws that reside 
with the legislative arm can however be delegated to another body but the 
                                                          
31 Henry Thring,  Practical Legislation 1818 ,13  
32 Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of Law of Constitution 10th edn 1959 52-53  
33 Legislative Instrument Act 2003 (LIA) Australian, see also Statutory Instrument Act in United Kingdom 
34 Constitution FRN 1999 as Amended 
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legislature must first lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford 
guidance for carrying out the policy before it delegates it to a subsidiary body.35 
Section 27(1) of the Interpretation Act underscores this fact.36  
 
Compared to the British system, delegated legislation is also made under an 
enabling Act. However, the British system have various procedures to which rule 
making can be subjected. This could be either be affirmative procedure, negative 
procedure or to no express procedure,37 in which case they come into force if no 
objection is made. The type of procedure that the instrument is subjected to 
determine the level of scrutiny that parliament can exercise on it. As such, for 
more significant instrument the affirmative procedure is used.38 Here also, 
emphasis is placed on laying of such instrument before parliament or its 
committee for it to come into force. These methods serve as a check on delegated 
legislation.   
 
2.4 Why is Delegated Legislation Needed? 
The need for delegated legislation in modern society is not farfetched. Due to the 
increasing complexities of modern societies and the impossibility of regulating 
all activities in primary legislation delegated legislation has become inevitable.39 
Government rely on it as public general Acts to give legal effect to its policies40 
and as legislative machinery in relation to matters of commencement, duration or 
application of an Act and to modify existing laws.41 It has been used as reserve 
power to make consequential amendment on matters that may not have been 
foreseen at the time when the enabling Act was enacted. In such instances such a 
delegated legislation amends the enabling Act which is known as the Henry VIII 
                                                          
35 Ihmanobe  ( n 20)196 
36 Cap 192 LFN 1990  
37 Greenberg, Craise on Legislation (n 22) 337 
38 Ibid 339 
39 Muktar A, Etudaiye, ‘ The Status of Tax, Duties, Fees and Legislative Powers’, Unilorin.edu.ng  assessed 
August 4th 2014    
40 McLeod (n 5) 147 
41 Carr (n 25) 
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Clause.42 Some Acts wholly depend on the enactment of delegated legislation. 
These Acts are described as “Skeleton Acts” They have the general structure of 
an intended law but leave all the details to be provided in a delegated legislation.43 
Others rely on delegated legislation not merely to administer their provisions but 
also to give them substance.44  
 
Consequently, through delegated legislation immense legislative powers have 
been delegated to the executives and other administrative bodies without 
adequate measures put in place to check how these powers are exercised. This 
has been the problem from its origin. It was against this backdrop that the 
Donoughmore Scott Committee was set up in 1929 to consider the powers 
exercised by the Ministers of the crown through delegated legislation and decide 
what safeguards can be put in place for the constitutional principles of the 
sovereignty of the Parliament and the Supremacy of the rule of law.45 This 
committee however affirmed the necessity and desirability of delegated 
legislation because they felt if parliament does not delegate its powers to legislate, 
it would not be able to pass the quality of legislation that society expects.46  
 
However, the desirability and the inevitability of this form of law making should 
not be allowed to obscure the limitation of the authority to legislate if our 
constitutional sanctity is to be maintained.47 As such we should be able to make 
a distinction between those delegation that are normal and made under clear 
defined powers that are confined to details and those that are exceptional which 
confreres powers and delegate on matters of principle, or amend the Acts of 
parliament, or exclude the jurisdiction of the court and are so wide that one is not 
                                                          
42 C Forsyth & E Kong, ‘The Constitution and Prospective Henry VIII Clauses’, 2004 Judicial Review 17  
43 Greenberg, Craise on Legislation (n 22) 117 
44 National Migration and Asylum Act 2002 in the United Kingdom 
45 Miers and Page (n 8)145 
46 Donoughmore Committee report on Ministers Powers, 1929,23 
47 Etudiaye (n 39) 257 
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able to know the limits that parliament intends to impose on them.48  Though in 
practice, it may not be easy to make this distinction because at the end of the day 
it is the government through its majority that decides what the Act should contain 
and what should be left to be delegated to it. Also, because delegated legislation 
derogates from the principle of separation of powers,49 it is required that 
Parliament should be able to keep a watch on the exercise of these powers.    
 
2.5   Types of Delegated Legislation  
Delegated legislation has many forms. It could be by way of orders in council, 
statutory instrument, regulations, rules, orders schemes, warrants and 
directions.50 It should be noted that the boundaries between the different types of 
subsidiary legislation are not fixed. It generally depends on the wordings of the 
Primary Act. A brief explanation of each will be necessary at this point. 
I. Orders in Council: - In England, these legislations are made by the 
Queen on the advice of the Privy Council. They are generally used 
where it would be inappropriate for a Minister to make the order. It is 
mainly used for constitutional matters such as the transfer of powers 
from one minister to another or to bring into force an emergency power 
that is to be exercised by ministers. A distinctive feature to note about 
this type of subsidiary legislation is that they are primary legislation if 
made in the exercise of royal prerogative but subsidiary legislation if 
made in the exercise of statutory power.51  
II. Orders of Council: - these are made by the Lord of the Privy Council in 
their own right and it relates to the regulation of professional bodies 
over which the Privy Council exercises supervisory authority. 
III. Ministerial Orders: - these are orders made by Ministers of the Crown. 
                                                          
48 Miers  and Page (n 8)146 
49 Etudiaye (n 39) 257 
50 Miers and Page ( n 8)140 
51 McLeod ( n 5) 160 
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IV. Orders: - are also made by Ministers in exercise of executive power.  
V. Rules: - these prescribe procedural matters. For example rules 
governing court procedure. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules 2009 were made pursuant to the powers conferred on 
the Chief Justice of Nigeria.52  
VI. Regulations: - here the Ministers actually makes the substantive law. It 
sets out in details how an Act is to be implemented, for example in 
Nigeria, the terms and conditions to obtain loan from the National 
Housing Fund were made by the Minister of Housing under the powers 
conferred by Section 25 of the National Housing Fund Act.53  
VII Byelaws: - these are laws of local application made by Local 
Authority and are restricted to certain areas only. They are mainly to 
control the activities of people in public places such as parks, public 
transport etc. 
VIII Directions: - are given by the Minister to a public body by way of 
legally binding instructions on how it exercises its functions. Example 
the Electoral Tribunal and Court Practice Direction 2011 were made 
by the President of the Court of Appeal under the powers conferred 
by Sections 243 and 285 of the Constitution and section 245(2) of the 
Electoral Act. 
 
Having seen the reasons that have been given for the donation of law making 
power, it is obvious that it is a necessity for every modern society to delegate 
some of its law making powers to the executive. Parliament has limited time and 
therefore cannot be engaged in the full details of the law as is required by the 
society today. Society has become more complex in its approach and the only 
                                                          
52 Section 46(3) of the Constitution FRN 1999 
53 Cap N 45, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
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way that Parliament can keep up with this trend is to delegate some of its law 
making power to the government. In the same vein, parliament possesses the 
power to controls its exercise as the delegation of these law making powers does 
not mean a denudation of such powers. These powers can be withdrawn by the 
Parliament. Therefore Government should be made to justify the powers which 
they intend should be delegated to them. This will enable the Parliament or its 
committee to ascertain by itself the level of scrutiny it should exercise over a 
particular piece of legislation. This would make regulators think carefully about 
delegated powers and serve as a safeguard to prevent bad quality legislation.      
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CHAPTER THREE 
      Justification for Delegated Legislation 
 The changing nature of the society requires that state would regulate more the 
activities of its citizens and the way to go about this is through delegated 
legislation. Therefore its importance cannot be over emphasised. As it is argued 
“if parliament were not willing to delegate law making powers, it would be unable 
to pass the quality of law which modern society require.”54 In this regard, several 
writers have seen the need for delegated legislation.  
 
As far back as 1893 Sir Henry Jenkins in support of the delegation of legislation   
wrote: 
“statutory rules are in themselves great public advantage because the 
details can thus be regulated after the bill passes into an Act with greater 
care and minuteness and with great adaptation to local and other special 
circumstances than they can possibly be in the passage of a Bill through 
Parliament.55  
 
Smith is also of the view that complex reforms will prove abortive unless 
parliament after laying down the general principle were to entrust the responsible 
Ministers with their detailed implementation.56 What this shows is the 
inevitability of delegated legislation. Succinctly, some reasons have been given 
why delegated legislation is regarded as a normal feature in most modern 
societies. An analysis of these reasons given are treated below.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Report of the Committee on Ministers p 23 
55 Greenberg, Craise on Legislation, (n 22) quoting Sir Henry Jenkins First Parliamentary Counsel, 291 
56 S.A De Smith, Delegated Legislation in England, the Western Political Quarterly Vol. 2 ,No 4 Dec 1949, 514-
526 at 516   
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3.1 Reasons for Delegated Legislation  
3.1.1 Pressure on Parliamentary Time 
One of the first arguments that was put in support of delegated legislation was the 
pressure on parliamentary time. Modern legislation requires more time and details 
than Parliament has the time or inclination to handle.57 With this shortage of 
parliamentary time, requiring them to enact the minute details of every legislation 
will be impossible. Therefore, its concentration on the essentials58 while leaving 
details to be worked out by the departments is a welcome development. Henry 
Thring in support of this is of the view that, parliament will have more time for 
the consideration of more serious questions involved in legislation, if subordinate 
matters can be withdrawn from its cognisance.59 
 
3.1.2 Emergency Powers   
The relative speed with which delegated legislations are usually made is also an 
advantage to it.60 This is very necessary in times of emergency. An example is 
the Emergency Power Act of Nigeria 1961, which confers on the President the 
power to make regulations that are necessary or expedient for the purpose of 
maintaining order in the country. Subsequent upon that, the President has made 
regulations declaring some states in the federation under Emergency rule.61 These 
laws are easy to amend and revoke so as to make them up to date and meet up 
with the needs of the society. They allow for quick changes without government 
having to push through a completely new Act and they can be used for those 
schemes involving economic control that require high level of flexibility for their 
implementation.62  
 
 
                                                          
57 R v St Helens Justices ex p Jones [1999] 2 All ER 73 at 83. 
58 S G G Edger, Craise on Statute Law, Seventh edn, London Sweet and Maxwell, 1971, 291 
59 Thring (n 31)    
60 McLeod, (n 5) 160 
61 State of Emergency (Certain States of the Federation) Proclamation 2013 
62 Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting ( n 7) 404  
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3.1.3 Technical Character of Modern Legislation   
Legislators do not most times have the expertise and the knowledge that is 
required for certain legislations. An example of this are laws concerning safety 
and technology. These laws require experts that are knowledgeable in the 
particular area.  In such a situation, Parliament will be required to deliberate on 
the main issues thoroughly and leave out the details to be field in by the experts. 
In connection with that, Parliament may not be the best institution to recognise 
and deal with local issues as it affects local people. As such Councillors that have 
been elected by the local people who are more aware of their needs tend to pass 
bye laws that will take care of the needs of their local communities.  
 
3.1.4 Need for Flexibility  
Another justification for delegated legislation could be seen with regards to the 
relative speed with which it can be made.63 Delegated legislation is capable of 
changing rapidly and adjusting to situations.64 This makes it suitable to be used 
for certain types of regulations like those whose details have not been fully 
worked out at the time when the Act is being passed. Others are those statutes 
which are likely to change frequently example fees payable for the application of 
a licence.  
 
The foregoing, has made it clear that the conditions and situations that require for 
the use of delegated legislation may be weighty but this does not mean that the 
traditional role of the legislature being the body that is responsible for law making 
should be ignored. This rule is still very prevalent in our legal system only that it 
should be relaxed when necessary.65 Also, there is no dispute that the primary use 
of delegated legislation is to allow statutory authorities to fill in the details of a 
statutory scheme. The question that may arise at this point is whether delegated 
                                                          
63 McLeod, (n 5) 160 
64 Edger, ( n 58) 291 
65 Xanthaki, (n 7)Thornton’s Legislative Drafting, 405 
23 
 
legislation is actually used for this purpose? Considering the extent to which some 
of these legislations go.  
 
Despite this fact, delegated legislation is bound to remain part of our politics. It 
is seen that in recent times, parliament has tended to delegate more of their powers 
than they have done in the past. Without this, the administration of modern public 
services would be at best slow and at worst impossible.66 Thus, the concept of 
delegated legislation is not only seen as desirable, but highly convenient.67  
Parliament after making the law can entrust the responsible Minister with the 
details of implementation.68 So there is no reducing the amount of delegated 
legislation that can be made. The only issue for discussion is what are the present 
safeguards and how far are they adequate? In answering this question certain 
points have to be borne in mind. The issue of who may make the legislation, the 
grant of powers, its scope of application, the criteria for its exercise and the 
procedure to be followed. These are all issues that needs to be clearly defined. 
These issues needs to be settled before subsidiary legislation can be said to satisfy 
the criteria of quality. Also, in the course of delegation, care should be taken not 
to delegate power for the wrong reasons. The identity of the delegate and the 
extent to which powers can be delegated are all matters that are very important.  
To this end, provision needs to be in place which will ensure that administrative 
bodies while making delegated legislation, do not use their powers in a way that 
is not contemplated by the parliament. To ensure that they do not go outside their 
given authority they should be watched by parliament.69   
 
Every society is sceptical about abusive executive power.70 Therefore these 
powers to legislate should not be left unchecked otherwise this trend rather than 
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fulfil its purpose can pose a danger to democracy. In the exercise of this power, 
authority must flow from the primary Act. Vague enabling laws can open the 
floodgates to dictatorship as such should be used sparingly. Primary Acts should 
specify the content, purpose and extent of the legislative authority as a means of 
preventing legislative abdication.71 This is because misapplied power is not only 
dangerous it is wasteful. 
 
The significance of delegated legislation can be seen in terms of the number of 
people that is affected by it generally. Therefore, a theory that proposes that the 
law making power should be left only in the hands of the elected officials may 
not be sound at this point. In its exercise, it should be confined to the normal type 
of delegated legislation where powers are open and confined to details rather than 
those that are vague and their limits cannot be defined. This will prevent 
authorities from doing whatever they please in delegated legislation or even go 
to the extent that the primary legislation has not envisaged.72  
 
Confined within its limits delegated legislation is not incompatible with good 
administration.  The fact that powers are delegated to other authorities does not 
impair the superior power of law making conferred on the legislature. But, the 
situation in Nigeria still leaves a lot to be desired. There are no general pattern or 
procedure that must be followed in the making of these legislation. The procedure 
to be followed in a particular case largely depends on the enabling law itself.73 
This leaves every case to be adjudged on its own merit. Government officials are 
seen to give any reason they deem fit for regulations that are made. The point as 
to whether these regulations that are made are used to fill in details rather than 
make substantive laws are not been checked by anyone. Statues empowering 
executives to make regulations may include powers to alter the enabling statute 
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that confers the power.74 In other words, the law makers’ control of delegated 
legislation is not as effective as it should be. Judicial control which is mostly 
relied on is not satisfactory because often times it is belated if not crippled by the 
sheer indifference of people. Several other problems could be pointed out but 
suffice it to say that a situation where delegated legislation do not fall within 
clearly defined details of the primary Act or where the powers conferred are so 
wide that one cannot tell what the actual limits are is to say the least not 
justifiable.   
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CHAPTER 4 
                          Criticism of Delegated Legislation 
Having realised the need for delegated legislation, the argument that law making 
power should be concentrated only in the hands of the elected officials is an 
argument that does not appear to be sound. This is why the criticisms against 
delegated legislation does not seem to be based on the volume or the 
cumbersomeness75 of the legislation, rather it is based on other matters such as 
the lack of adequate control and the tendency of it being abused. An analysis of 
the criticisms that has been put up against delegated legislation will be made to 
see the extent to which such critics are justified. It is only when we fully 
understand some of the challenges that this form of law brings that we will be 
able to respond properly with solutions that can effectively address the problem.   
 
4.1 Deals with Matters to be in Primary Legislation  
A major criticism of delegated legislation as put by Daintith and Page is that, 
there has been an increasing tendency for government to use it as a means to deal 
with matters of principles and policy rather than with details.76 There is the 
argument that measures that are supposed to be in primary legislation are 
sometimes slipped into delegated legislation. The general presumption is that 
delegated legislation is meant to take care of the details of the law after the 
legislature has laid down its structure and in doing this, it should be in line with 
what has been stipulated in the enabling Act. Anything to the contrary, is an 
aberration.  
 
This position does not even go down well with some critics who are of the view 
that, allowing the delegate to fill in the details while making the law only in a 
skeleton form is not fair to the citizens because such details are expected to be 
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filled in by the elected representatives of the people.77  Ojo argues that most times 
the enabling Acts merely state the subject on which the regulations is to be made 
without further indication as to what kind of legislation is intended to be 
authorised.78 In this way, very crucial matters are left to be handled by the rule 
making agency. 
 
4.2 Makes Executives too Powerful    
There is also the criticism that, the executives are becoming too powerful as a 
result of the over reliance of government on delegated legislation.79 Executives 
could make laws without passing it to the Parliament for scrutiny.80 Page points 
out that the use of emergency power highlighted a more general tendency for the 
amount of delegated legislation to increase.81  Most prominent among the critics 
was Lord Chief Justice Hewart who in his New Despotism alleged 
“administrative lawlessness and an over mighty executive.”82Concerns here were 
mainly on the use of Henry Viii Clause which has the effect of amending or 
repealing primary legislation.83 Beatson described this form of law making as 
tipping the balance too far in favour of administrative branch at the expense of 
the Parliament.84  Rippon alleged that they are used at an alarming high rate85 
This creates the fear that they may even be used to modify what parliament has 
already laid down or better still be used in a radical manner that is not envisaged 
by the parliament which is not far from what is happening today. This obviously 
transcends the classical functions of simply empowering the administrative 
authority to supplement statutory schemes.86  
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All these concerns led to the setup of the Donoughmore committee who later 
came to stress the significance and the desirability of delegated legislation as a 
system of law-making. Although the Donoughmore committee unequivocally 
affirmed the desirability and constitutionality of delegated legislation, a line has 
to be drawn between what is proper and what is improper delegation.  
 
4.3 No Limits in Enabling Clauses  
Other criticism that is made against the concept of delegated legislation is that 
delegated authorities are given the power to make laws most times without 
limitations. This goes to the extent that, the powers of the courts to control them 
are even ousted.87 As a result of this, they may make laws that are unreasonable 
since they are not been scrutinised by any authority. 
 
This criticism however raises a lot of debate, as the criteria that can be used by 
the courts to determine what amounts to unreasonableness is very subjective. It 
is true that the issue of unreasonableness is a grounds under which a delegated 
legislation may be struck down as being ultra vires. However, the powers of the 
court to decide what is unreasonable is determined by what is contained in the 
enabling Act. The court can only consider an act to be unreasonable if it exceeds 
the scope of the statutory authority and thus declare it as ultra vires.88 Acts may 
seem unreasonable on the face of it but the court may still not be able to set such 
Acts aside as they may still fall well within the scope of the discretion given by 
the enabling Act. This goes to show that an Act that is taken within the framework 
of a legislation will only be set aside if it can be shown that in its exercise the 
delegate has gone outside the framework of the authority. See the case of 
Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corporation.89 However, it 
should be noted that courts can also look at the intention behind the parent 
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legislation to decide whether the government is acting lawfully in making the 
subsidiary legislation or not and if it is not, the court will declare it ultra vires.90 
 
4.4 Inadequate Control by the Parliament 
Control over delegated legislation by the Parliament, has been a major source of 
criticism.91 Parliament do not have the time or the expertise to keep some of these 
legislations under check as such delegates carry out this function the way it 
pleases them with little or no form of surveillance on them. In most cases one 
finds that Parliament delegate powers on the subjective discretion of the 
delegate92 by the use of  such loosely worded phrase like “if the Minister is 
satisfied”, “in the opinion of the Minister”, “as he deems fit.” The use of these 
type of phrases are dangerous93 and may lead to arbitrariness. The extent of these 
powers are so wide that it is difficult to know the limits of the delegate. Ojo 
describes it as making the delegate a judge in his own matter.94 In Nigeria, many 
of these delegates use these powers as a past time as such they make and amend 
other legislations by implication without thinking of the consequences of their 
actions.95  
 
Also, most of these regulations are made subject to the approval of a higher body. 
This approval is usually sought after the regulation has been made but before it 
comes into force. The question that arises here is, what happens when the 
rulemaking body does not get the necessary approval which is what happens often 
in Nigeria. The law does not in this instance give an alternative of what should 
be done and this may occasion injustice to the people. One way to go about this 
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is to make it a condition precedent for the operation of the Act. In this way the 
regulation does not take effect if all the conditions are not met.   
 
4.5. Cumbersomeness and Non-compliance with Procedural Rules   
The sheer volume of delegated legislation is another matter that has attracted                          
criticism. Coupled with that, there is sometimes noncompliance with publication 
and consultation. Several of these laws are made without people being able to 
find them as a result of non-publication. Most often, people are hardly aware 
when these laws are made as there is no consultation. In Nigeria, even when they 
are published, they do so in different places and this makes it impossible for the 
citizens to know what the present law is.  
 
Regulators can get away with this because, in many cases, the enabling law does 
not impose a duty on the delegate to give notice of the proposed rulemaking. This 
creates a lot of unfairness as the people who are bound by these laws sometimes 
have no idea of these laws and where publication is required, failure to publish 
does not invalidate the Act.96 Consequently, citizens remain in complete 
ignorance of what rights and their property has been secretly conferred by the 
Minister on some authority and to what residual rights they may be entitled to 
under the Act.97 This makes the law to be inaccessible and to be bugged down 
with some of the problems that are associated with primary legislation whereby 
citizens find it difficult to understand. 
 
4.6 Undemocratic 
Furthermore, the fact that delegated legislation takes law-making away from the 
democratically elected persons to persons who are not elected is a criticism 
against delegated legislation. This situation though acceptable as a result of the 
demands on the parliamentary time, but the fact that Parliament is not able to 
provide sufficient control is a problem. To crown it all, neither of the Houses of 
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Parliament even in the course of scrutiny can make amendment to these 
legislation.98 They either accept the whole or they reject the whole of it without 
any form of amendment. In Britain, the possibility of amending delegated 
legislation has been considered at some point, but when it was thought that an 
amendment of the standing orders will be able to effect this change, it was 
however realised that, this will not be sufficient. What will be required will be a 
change of all the enabling clauses. This will cause a lot of complications and 
invariably go contrary to the intention of the parliament and frustrate the purpose 
for which these powers were given.99 However, not all types of delegated 
legislation has this problem. Bye laws that are made by the Local Government 
Authorities do not fall under this class because they are definitely made by 
democratically elected persons.  
 
Other issues that have been raise are those that have to do with sub delegation. In 
this case, law making is handed down a second level. This has raised the criticism 
that delegated legislations are laws that are being made by civil servants and they 
argue that the legislature is just a rubber stamps that do the biddings of the 
executive.  
 
Despite the criticisms against delegated legislation, the fact is that this type of 
legislation is here to stay in so far as it promotes the effectiveness of the overall 
law making system. To achieve this purpose, mere delegation is not enough, there 
has to be the proper framework and procedure that must be followed for it to 
achieve its desired aim. For every power that is given, there should be some way 
for the recipient to be accountable to some sort of authority as to how that power 
is used or exercised. When these powers are used arbitrarily against individuals 
they should be able to access the courts to enforce their basic liberties on a basis 
of equality and fairness since they have been more or less subjected to an adhoc 
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system of law-making. This is most times not easy as the citizens themselves may 
compromise. There is also the need for the parliament’s powers to delegate to be 
properly defined and streamlined. This is to ensure that in the delegation of these 
powers the parliament does not abdicate its powers. 100 
 
The foregoing issues raised has shown how easily bad delegated legislation can 
be harboured in our legal system in the course of making delegated legislation. 
The process of sub delegation is something that can lead to legislative 
interference and this is even worse when such powers are based on the subjective 
discretion of the delegate. As such great care is to be taken as to how these powers 
are being extended.101 These powers most times are exercised without a reflection 
of some of the implication it can have on other laws and the society at large 
because they are done with no formality whatsoever.  
 
Considering the fact that, legislation is the way through which a government can 
truly govern its people, and achieve its social and economic policies,102 delegated 
legislation is obviously a very important tool for this to be achieved. 103 How these 
powers are controlled will determine whether they will effectively carry out the 
intention of the government or harbour bad legislation. The scope of the powers 
that are given must be expressly defined in the enabling Act and it must be 
exercised within that bounds. Contrary to this the Parliament should be able to 
exercise its powers against it.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Control of Delegated Legislation  
As said earlier in previous chapters, the essential theory of delegated legislation 
is that, while parliament deals directly with the general principle, the executives 
or other body that are empowered to make delegated legislation deals with the 
details.104 This division of law making powers between the Parliament and the 
executive raises the question of control105 which though familiar is still far from 
resolved.106 Most of the criticisms of delegated legislation boarders on lack of 
control. This is because there is the realisation that if there was no effective 
control, regulators may want to do as they please and this will be detrimental to 
the society at large.   
 
There are various kinds of control that have been put in place to safeguard the 
exercise of these powers. Some put in place by the Parliament while others are 
put in place by external bodies. However, it has been argued that, Parliament who 
is the giver of these powers should be able to exercise the most control of 
delegated legislation.107 Since the granting of these powers require the consent of 
Parliament, it has the opportunity to consider the powers sought at the time when 
the parent Act is before it as a bill.108 Also, through its committees, Parliament 
can be able to exercise some level of scrutiny to ensure that legislative measures 
are in line with its intentions.  
 
It has been argued that the involvement of parliament in delegated legislation 
defeats the conferment of these powers to make delegated legislation. This 
argument in itself cannot be taken very far because delegated legislation is at the 
very core of society since laws that emanate from it touches on most aspects of 
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the society even more than the primary legislation.109 Therefore a call for more 
attention on how these powers are exercised is what is more appropriate.  
 
The fact that, this type of legislation is given by persons other than those who are 
elected for that purpose makes it necessary that measures be put in place for its 
control. Parliament should be able to ensure proper exercise of these powers by 
developing adequate procedure and laying standards that should be followed in 
the formulation of rules and regulations.110 This can be done by looking at the 
enabling clause and prescribing several control features like tabling, 
disallowance, and prescribing some procedural requirements like consultation 
and publication and the affirmation by both Houses of Parliament.111 These 
conditions ought to be met before regulations can be said to be in force.   
 
The question however is, how effective have these measures been in the 
prevention of bad quality of delegated legislation. This will be addressed in this 
chapter in the light of all the shortcomings that exist in Nigeria, as the country 
does not really have in place an adequate system of legislative scrutiny of 
delegated legislation. What seems to be relied on here is judicial control which is 
not enough112 because, decisions that are made under judicial review seems to 
affect only parties to it as against Parliamentary scrutiny that cuts across the 
whole society.   
 
5.1 Control of Delegated Legislation and Its Problems    
The control of delegated legislation is not without its own problems even in well-
established democracies like the United Kingdom. The British system has certain 
committees that are in charge of the scrutiny of Statutory Instruments (SIs). These 
are the Joint Committee on Statutory Instrument and the Commons Select 
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Committee on Statutory Instrument. These committees scrutinize SIs to see where 
they are defective in terms of drafting, unauthorised use of power, ultra vires or 
to see if they have been unduly delayed to be brought before Parliament.113 Where 
there are defects, they bring this to the notice of the House. This process has been 
described as being an empty form as most times, no further action is taken by the 
House by way of debate since most of the SIs are really not debated.114  
 
Also, the procedure that is adopted for the making of these SIs determine the level 
of scrutiny that Parliament can have on it. Government departments who are 
responsible for the instruments determines the choice of procedure that will apply 
to a particular instrument.115 Affirmative procedure is not often used, rather, the 
negative procedure whereby the regulation takes effect in the absence of 
disapproval or annulment is what is mostly used for the simple reason that it 
places less pressure on parliamentary time.  
The scrutiny of these instrument are mostly done by a standing committee and 
this is when they are affirmative instruments. They may only be debated on the 
floor of the House where there is an agreement with the government or where the 
negative procedure is used and they are prayed against which rarely happens. This 
makes scrutiny on the floor of the House seem to be rarely possible.  
 
Although, these Committees seem to exercise some degree of scrutiny over 
delegated legislation, the dominance of the executive makes it almost impossible 
for a disapproval of an instrument that the committee is against. Also, the fact 
that approval cannot be subject to amendment116 and Parliament not being free to 
determine those instruments that should be subject to scrutiny on their merit and 
those which should not are all matters that have made it difficult to have proper 
scrutiny of these legislations.  
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The decision as to whether a particular instrument requires parliamentary debate 
is a decision that the parliament itself should make and not the executives. Using 
the availability of time as the distinction between those instruments that should 
be given affirmative resolution and those that should be given negative resolution 
makes it impossible for instruments to receive the scrutiny in proportion to their 
merit. Instruments that are considered under the affirmative resolution may not 
always be more important than those that are considered under the negative 
resolution.  
 
With regards to the requirement of laying, it is deemed satisfied once the 
document has been submitted to the votes and proceedings office of the 
Parliament or the office of the Clerk of the House is notified of it. This exercise 
is seen as a mere procedure and does not give the Parliament the opportunity to 
have formal discussion on it. Page has argued that the procedure was clearly in 
response to the pressure of when instruments come into force and it is taken that 
by laying of the instrument before the parliament, it brings such an instrument 
into operation.117  
 
It is easy to see the overriding need for caution in the exercise of delegated 
legislation. One of the things we set out to consider in this paper is whether 
delegated legislation is done under proper authority and in line with the powers 
conferred. This is what forms the guiding principle of delegated legislation 
coupled with fact that the legislature must be able to lay down the policy in 
respect of a given measure which will serve as a guideline to delegates to whom 
this responsibility is vested. When these guidelines are in place, it is used as a 
criteria and easy to see when regulators step out of the line. At this juncture, there 
is need to scrutinise selected enactments in Nigeria, in order to consider how they 
have fared under this criteria.  
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Section 35 of the Fire Arms Act Cap 69 (1958) empowers the Inspector General 
of Police to delegate all or any of his powers or duties conferred on him under the 
Act to any Police Officer. The observation that could be made with regards to this 
is that, this may be the wordings of the enabling clause but is that really the intent 
of the Law? Can any Police Officer really carry out all the duties that are 
conferred on the Inspector General?  
 
Secondly, Lagos State Legal Notice No 10 of 1999 made pursuant to powers 
conferred under Section 12 Tribunal of Enquiry Law Cap 190 Laws of Lagos 
State of Nigeria 1994. Makes provision to the effect that powers exercised under 
it has the effect of judgement of a court and cannot be reviewed by a court or shall 
any appeal lie to it. This obviously cannot be in line with the powers conferred to 
make this regulation. 
 
Thirdly, Section 43 (d) of the Electric Power Authority Act 1990 empowers the 
Minister to prescribe any fee or anything which is to be prescribed generally for 
the better carrying out of the purpose and provision of the Act. This is a wide-
ranging power that does not seem to have any clear limit. 
 
Fourthly, Section 107 of the Stamp Duties Act 1990 empowers the President or 
the Governor to make regulations to increase, diminish or repeal chargeable duty 
under the Act subject to the approval of the National Assembly or State Houses 
of Assembly. Since there is no scrutiny in any of the parliaments this exercise is 
carried out purely on violation of the intent of the law.   
 
Section 9(2) of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Center Act of 1964 provides 
that an order made under the Act shall be laid before the legislature within 
fourteen days of its making. Also, Section 12(1) of the Yellow Fever and 
Infectious Disease (Immunisation) Act (Laws of the Federation 1991) provides 
that the |President or the Governor of a state may declare by order, any disease to 
be infectious and such an order must be laid before the legislature at the next 
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meeting after the making of the order and if the legislature disapproves, it shall 
cease to have effect but without prejudice to anything previously done under it. 
These powers are exercised in violation since the approval of the House is not 
sought.  
 
There are also cases with regards to how delegated power is exercised in Nigeria 
a few will be considered here. Attorney General of Abia State v Attorney General 
of the Federation,118 where a bad piece of subsidiary legislation was declared 
invalid. Also, in Attorney General of Bendel State v Attorney General of the 
Federation,119 where it was held that it was unlawful for the Bendel State House 
of Assembly to pass into law the Revenue Allocation Bill on ground that it was 
not the proper authority to exercise this power.120 Other cases involving delegated 
legislation were on the ground that it violated the constitution or the enabling 
legislation. 121  
 
From the above discussions, it is clear that parliament needs to be alert to prevent 
the exercise of delegated legislation as enumerated above. This is necessary 
because these rules affect the core of the existence of the citizens. Critics are of 
the view that the process of delegated legislation in Nigeria is inadequate.122 They 
have argued that, it is important that general statutory provisions relating to the 
exercise of delegated legislation be introduced as early as possible so that they 
can be placed before the Federal Parliament.123  
 
The laying requirement as applicable in Britain is not carried out in the Parliament 
in Nigeria. The object of laying is for the legislature to be able to scrutinise these 
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instruments either before or after they are made to ensure that they are in line with 
the stated requirements, but unlike the British system, in Nigeria, there are no 
committees that are put in charge of this processes. Instruments that are laid do 
not go through any further legislative process by the House or a committee of the 
House, as such, most of the instruments that are made go unchecked since the 
mechanisms to check it is hardly in place. Departments and regulators carry on 
this duty with little or no control.  
 
There are situations where the enabling statute states in the schedule the subject 
of which a regulation or rule might be made. 124For instance the Emergency 
Power Act 1964125 enumerates nine items upon which regulations can be made 
by the President. Also, the Fire Arms Act of 1958126 makes provision in the 
schedule for about twelve items upon which regulations can be made. The reason 
for this is so that there is a clear field upon which the executives can legislate and 
to ensure that they are confined to that field. In a situation where there are no 
checks to ensure that these guideline are strictly followed, there is the tendency 
that regulators could step out of the line and the citizens will be made to suffer.  
 
The wordings used to draft the enabling clauses also pose a problem in delegated 
legislation. They usually provide that “the President in Council may make 
regulations…” or where the powers are not to be exercised by the President, but 
by some other person, it is usually at the approval of a higher body. Some writers 
have argued that this will be able to provide a criteria for adequate parliamentary 
scrutiny and to ensure ministerial responsibility.127 The question is, to what extent 
is this kind of control effective, giving the fact that where the government 
commands majority the possibility of the laws that are desired to be passed by the 
government failing is very slim. 
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Even where scrutiny is done, Parliament is more interested in the political merits 
of these legislations.128 As a result of this, the controls that are exercised seems to 
be on the general aspect of the delegated legislation rather than on the details of 
such legislations because at the end of the day instruments are either approved or 
rejected in their entirety since there are no rules for their amendment.  
 
From the forgoing, it is clear that too little control gives the executives an 
opportunity to over step their bounds and too much control means that the value 
of delegating is lost.129 Against this backdrop it is clear that for society to prevent 
bad quality of delegated legislation there has to be a balance. Rule-making power 
should be carried out within certain clear limits and under the watchful control of 
the Parliament in other to prevent the harbouring of bad quality legislation.   
 
5.2 Effects of Parliamentary Scrutiny on Delegated Legislation  
Despite these shortcomings, as states become increasingly regulated and 
legislative powers more frequently delegated, parliament is continually being 
called upon to devise control measures over delegated legislation. There is the 
need to analyse some of the procedures that can be adopted by the Parliament.  
In determining the extent of parliamentary scrutiny and its effects on delegated 
legislation, the starting point is for Parliament to look at the enabling clause in 
the primary legislation.130 It is from the enabling clause that the permitted content 
and the nature of the subsequent delegated legislation will be determined.131 
Question relating to the granting or restricting of powers to make delegated 
legislation or the form that it should take will arise here.132 Parliament before the 
passing of the primary Act should ensure that the Powers that are conferred in the 
enabling clause should be both substantial and clear. When it is found that the 
enabling clause has not been followed in the making of delegated legislation, 
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members have the right to bring private member bills against it. Parliament can 
also amend the enabling statute, to restrict or withdraw the rule-making 
powers.133  
 
If the approach in Canada is taken at the time when they were also developing 
their own system of delegated legislation, Parliament had to in most cases use 
normal procedure to discuss issues of power that it had delegated to the 
executives. This at some point became necessary in order to prevent the abuse of 
these powers.134 
 
Another means of control that can be put in place is that, the bills proposing to 
delegate legislative powers should be accompanied by a memorandum explaining 
the scope and the nature of the delegation. This memorandum should go as far as 
explaining why these matters are to be treated under delegated legislation rather 
than under the primary Act. This will enable the Parliament to decide whether the 
delegation is appropriate135 and whether the level of parliamentary control as 
chosen by the departments136 are adequate.  
 
It should be noted that, the care with which this job can be done diminishes 
proportionally with the increasing number of regulations that are required to be 
scrutinised.  Therefore, the answer to the situation would be to appoint standing 
committees in the various Houses of Parliament to be in charge of scrutiny of 
these instruments. These committees, having clear terms of reference are most 
suited to perform this function of scrutiny as the House cannot really do this on 
its floor as a result of the pressure on its time.   
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These committees, though may not have the powers to amend the bill, they can 
scrutinise the conferral powers to ensure that the delegated legislation falls within 
the ambit of the enabling law. Also, it can consider whether there has been an 
unusual or unexpected use of the statutory power.137 This means that scrutiny will 
on the long run be focusing on not only the political merit but also the technical 
merits of these legislations. 
The committee will have to expose those legislations that are verbose and 
unintelligible, it will also report on those delegated legislations that impose taxes 
and raise the issue of sub delegation. The vigilance of these committees have been 
effective in Britain in the sense that it brings to the attention of the House those 
instrument that are defective in form and substance. Where such instruments are 
found to be grossly inappropriate, they may be annulled on the motion of a 
member of the House.  
 
To buttress this further, Mallory has argued that the practice of tabling will be 
more effective if referred to committees for consideration.138 This will not only 
help in the aspect of scrutiny by checkmating the executives from ventilating their 
grievances through legislation but also preserve the principles of parliamentary 
supremacy at least in the area of law making. Also, it will help in the drafting of 
the legislative text as drafters who are attached to these committees, will have a 
chance to look at these legislation to ensure that they meet drafting requirements.   
 
However, with parliamentarians voting along party lines and the dominance of 
the government, how all this is to be achieved is another question. Having said 
that, this does not mean that it is impossible. Scrutiny has the effect of making 
the government and the civil servants that make these delegated legislation to be 
careful in the exercise of these powers. If applicable in Nigeria, it will go a long 
way to prevent the harbouring of bad delegated legislation.   
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5.3 Procedural Requirements   
There are some procedural requirements that ought to be met before the exercise 
of delegated legislation. These are also used by Parliament to put a check on the 
exercise of delegated legislation. In Nigeria, the enabling Act rarely impose any 
duty on the delegate to give notice of proposed measures, or to consult certain 
interest that are likely to be affected.139 Some jurisdiction like in the United States 
have statutory provisions with regards to this and it is a condition precedent for 
delegated legislation to be made. There is need to consider how this is used as a 
check on delegated legislation.  
 
5.3.1 Publication 
In Nigeria, some Acts provide specifically for the publication of regulations that 
are made. An example of this can be seen in Section 10 of the Nigerian 
Citizenship Act 1961 which provides for the President to publish in the Gazette 
any addition, alteration, amendment or replacement in the Act. Also, Section 
18(3) of the Extradition Act140 requires the Attorney General of the Federation to 
publish in the Gazette the amendment of the second schedule of the Act. 
Ordinarily, by the publication in the Gazette or in a newspaper that is in 
circulation within the area141 judicial notice is taken of it.  
 
In United Kingdom, this requirement is always complied with, though it has been 
argued that, where there is a failure to comply with it, it does not render the Act 
invalid.142 If one considers the legitimate expectation of people, coupled with the 
fact that ignorance of the law is not an excuse to those who contravene it. Then 
one would argue that there is need for adequate publicity to be given to all 
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instrument that affects the rights of people.143 These laws make rule by which 
individuals in the society are to conduct themselves. It is only fair that these rules 
be made open so that citizens will have the opportunity to know what the law is 
and conduct themselves accordingly.   
 
5.3.2 Consultation  
This is a process whereby steps are taken to inform those who will be affected by 
the proposed subordinate legislation of the intention to make such legislation and 
to give them the opportunity to comment on it.144 Depending on the statute that is 
being dealt with, it may require certain persons to be consulted or consultation 
can be open to the general public. In Nigeria, a situation where the interest of the 
public may be effected there is always a requirement that consultation should be 
with the Council of Ministers example Section 33(1) of the Fire Arms Act 
provides that the President after consulting with the Council of Ministers is 
empowered to make regulations for the carrying out of the general purpose of the 
Act.145  
 
It is, the role of Parliament to ensure that these procedure are followed in all 
delegated legislation for the sake of good administration because where these 
procedural elements of publication and consultation are lacking, it would seem 
unfair to the public who will be affected by the legislation for this may be the one 
chance they have in having a say in the regulation that would determine their 
conduct in the society.  
 
According to Schwartz,  an essential safeguard for those whose interest are to be 
affected by the  exercise of delegated legislation must lie in the procedure which 
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is adopted in arriving at the final settlement of rules by which they are to be 
bound.146 This is because, these rule will sometimes be made by government 
officials who will face little or no public criticism unlike the legislature in the 
making of these rules. These decisions are made in the departments and subject 
to no direct political control. The knowledge of such persons are rarely complete 
as such it is necessary for interested persons to always present their views and the 
facts that are within their knowledge and probably give an alternative course if 
need be.147 This will ensure that government officials do not just make rules that 
come out of their heads, but rules that adapt to the circumstances for which they 
are intended. The technical knowledge that could be brought in before any 
delegated legislation is made can be of immense benefit to the system as a whole 
because the essence of this consultation is to give advice. Therefore the powers 
so conferred should be made subject to the prior satisfaction of this condition of 
consultation.148  
 
In Nigeria, this requirement is only provided for in some Acts, both at the federal 
and the state levels, the importance of the affected persons in the rule making 
process is not realised. The inclusion of this requirement usually depends on the 
importance of the subject matter at hand. As such, the procedure to consult 
persons that are likely to be affected by proposed measures are not fully utilised. 
As a result of this people are not even aware that these rules are in place.   
 
The development of these requirement is in furtherance of the need to reduce as 
much as possible the arbitrariness in the law making process.149  The system of 
consultation makes for democratisation as it gives the citizens the feeling that 
they are not left out in the law making process.150 Therefore it is suggested that 
                                                          
146 Schwartz B, An Introduction to American Administrative Law (1962) 2nd Edn American Administrative Law 
1948, 37 
147 Ojo ( n 78) 233 
148 Greenberg ( n 22) 332    
149 Oleyami T O, The Challenges of Controlling Administrative Legislation in Nigeria, 202  
150 Ojo (n 78) 269 
46 
 
this is a matter that should not be left at the discretion of the government rather it 
should be a statutory requirement for rule making. A general statute to this effect 
would be a step in the right direction. 
 
5.4 How Scrutiny Affects Quality of Legislation  
If Parliament or its committee is able to put in place these checks, delegated   
legislations when made will conform to general drafting rules. Issues of clarity, 
unambiguity, precision and accessibility would be complied with. Such 
legislations would be made in clear and lucid form, the language to be used would 
be plain and the words precise.151 On the whole, such an instrument will promote 
the effectiveness of the overall legislative system. Powers would be transferred 
at the proper time and from trust worthy authorities.152 The manner of the transfer 
would be checked. Parliament will also be able to asses these legislation using 
clearer criteria to ensure that the instrument adheres to drafting convention which 
includes having simpler wordings and being consistent with existing legislations. 
It will comply with procedural rules and take into account the views of interested 
parties who must be consulted before these laws are made.153 This will lead to 
certainty and security in the law and on the long run effective judicial 
protection.154  
 
Bad quality of delegated legislation leads to vague and conflicting provisions and 
over regulations of the citizens which results in the loss of interest on the part of 
the citizens. When citizens loose interest in the law, compliance with it becomes 
a matter of fear of sanction rather than wilful compliance. Such laws impose 
excessive burden on citizens and possess a challenge on the enforcers of the law. 
For a system to prevent the harbouring of bad quality legislation, there is the need 
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that the parliament as an institution should be committed in imposing standards 
that must be met by the delegates before the exercise of rulemaking.  
5.5 Other means of Control 
5.5.1 Judicial Review 
The most frequently used method for controlling delegated legislation in Nigeria 
is judicial review.155 Here courts apply settled judicial principle for the 
interpretation of statutes.156 This power of the court was tested in 1962 when the 
Emergency Power Act was passed under which the President was able to make 
several regulations. That Act empowered the President in council to amend, 
suspend or modify a law enacted by any legislature in the country and a regulation 
made by him had the effect not withstanding anything inconsistent with it that 
was contained in any law and any provision of any law which was inconsistent 
with it shall to the extent of such inconsistency have no effect so long as the 
regulation remained in force. This is the Henry VIII Clause that has its origin 
from the United Kingdom.  
 
Several cases came up challenging both the reasonableness and the validity of 
this powers as exercised by the President. Prominent among them was FRA 
Williams v Majekodunmi.157  This case was against a restriction order which was 
one of the regulations that was made under that Act.  The court was only able to 
exercise its power of judicial review to set aside the restriction order on the 
grounds of unreasonableness. This has to do with how such powers fall within 
the four corners of the enabling Act and to ensure that such powers are carried 
out in good faith and nothing else. The courts have no power to inquire into the 
policy or any other scene of the transaction.158 What this shows is that courts will 
have the power to set aside a regulation based on the fact that proper procedure 
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has not been followed. The courts in doing this will have to follow whatever has 
been laid down in the enabling Act. Thus bringing us back to the foremost 
argument that parliament as the giver of this power is better placed to exercise 
adequate control of delegated legislation. There are however other grounds by 
which the courts can set aside a regulation. 
 
5.5.1.1   Review on Grounds of Ultra Vires.  
One other condition that delegated legislation has to comply with is the ultra vires 
rule. This rule states that delegated legislation cannot exceed the limits of the 
principal legislation.159 Here the court is to ensure that the powers that are 
exercised has not been broader than the terms of the delegation.160  According to 
Seidman, an agency may be in contravention of that rule when it exercises powers 
that are not delegated to it or matters that are not authorised by the delegated 
legislation or does this without taking into account the consideration that are 
prescribed in the delegated legislation or without following the procedures that 
are laid down in the principal Act.161 The court in the exercise of this power, can 
declare ultra vires any act that is not authorised by the enabling Act.162 This was 
seen in the case of Akingbade v Lagos Town Council.163 
 
5.5.1.2 Review on Grounds of  Sub-Delegation 
This is the Latin rule of delegatus non potest delegare which means that when 
powers are delegated to a person, such a person cannot delegate the powers 
delegated to another person except by express authorisation from the conferring 
authority.164 In the interpretation of this principle a distinction needs to be made 
between administrative matters and legislative matters. Most times we see that 
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when powers are conferred on the Minister or the Commissioner, officers of their 
department tend to act on their behalf.  If such powers are legislative in nature, 
we can hardly say that such legislative powers are also to be exercised by officers 
of their department going by this maxim. This is more so when a discretion has 
been given to a superior authority such a discretion cannot be exercised by a 
delegate. See case of Majiyagbe v A G and Ors165 where the court held that a 
revocation was not proper on the ground that being a statutory Act it cannot be 
delegated by the Governor.  
 
There are several cases where there has been a departure from this rule in Nigeria. 
This can be seen in the Fire Arms Act166 where it was provided that the Inspector 
General of Police may by notice published in the Gazette delegate all or any of 
his powers to a police officer.167 However, a distinction has to be made between 
administrative issues and legislative issues. 
 
Suffice it to say that, all the methods that are used to make delegated legislation 
can be reviewed by the courts in the case where there is abuse or in a situation 
where it has not been laid before the parliament where that is a requirement. 
Similarly, where there is non-approval or the delegate simply exceeds the powers 
that are conferred to it the court can declare delegated legislation to be null and 
void and of no effect. 
 
5.5.2 Executive Control 
Executive Control is another form of control that exist in Nigeria. The executives 
are always conscious of the fact that the law makers can always withdraw the 
delegated powers that they have conferred as such there are some level of control 
that it imposes on itself in the exercise of these powers in order not to be 
embarrassed by the exercise of parliamentary powers over its regulations.    
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5.6 Drafters Responsibility 
Delegated legislation most times are not drafted by the Parliamentary |Counsel 
even in the United Kingdom. They are usually drafted by the departmental 
lawyers and there is likely to be less formality in terms of process than in the 
primary legislation.168 The problem with this trend is that the departmental lawyer 
though they may be versed in the technicalities of the particular area of law, they 
may not be so experienced in the drafting of legislation. The British model 
however, takes certain precautions in this regard as statutory instrument that 
amend primary legislation are by rule shown to the Parliamentary Counsel in draft 
form. Also a few statutory instrument that tend to be problematic are given to the 
Parliamentary Counsel to draft on the instruction of the department.169   
 
In the same vain, when instruments are considered at the committee, drafters can 
have access and check that they are in line with drafting rules. In the Nigerian 
system, drafters are part of the committee system as such will be availed this 
opportunity if delegated legislations are considered by Parliamentary committees 
following the British model. 
 
It is obvious from the foregoing that the practice and experiences that are founded 
in some jurisdictions like the United Kingdom with regards to the control of 
delegated legislation are inapplicable in Nigeria. The kind of control that exist in 
Nigeria can be said to be more of political control because regulations are usually 
made by the President or the Governor in Council or if the powers are to be 
exercised by some other persons, on the approval of a higher authority.170 It has 
been argued that this is to some extent a kind of scrutiny in itself but the position 
in this paper is that such level of scrutiny is not enough.171    
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In Nigeria, there are no procedural rules that are followed or is much use made of 
the procedure whereby the enabling law will require consultation or publication 
as a condition precedent to the making of any delegated legislation. There are no 
general statute that requires that subsidiary legislation be laid before the 
parliament. Each bill is dealt with on its own merit. The form of laying that is 
done in Nigeria that is when it is done at all is simply laying without any further 
direction or control. An example of this is the Pensions Act 1958. Usually the 
clause for the laying reads thus 
“The Minister shall lay a copy of the regulations before the National 
Assembly as soon as possible after the regulations are made.”  
Also it should be noted that individual Acts that are made provides that these 
instruments that are made be published in the Gazette as soon as practicable. The 
meaning of the phrase “as soon as possible” and “as soon as practicable” are 
somewhat ambiguous and does not tell at what time this actions should be carried 
out.  
 
The truth is that Parliament cannot effectively control the exercise of delegated 
legislation in a mass.  It can only do this if delegated legislation is laid before it 
and with proper parliamentary procedure for challenging unsatisfactory 
regulation. Parliament will be able to fulfil a supervisory function in delegated 
legislation if provisions can be made for detailed scrutiny of certain instrument 
in small parliamentary committees with narrow but clearly defined terms of 
reference. This will reduce the risk of constitutionally undesirable features being 
imported into delegated legislation.172 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
The focus of this dissertation is to bring to the fore the main reasons why bad 
quality delegated legislation is harboured in the Nigerian legal system. It 
attributes it mainly to the lack of adequate parliamentary scrutiny. This might not 
be the only reason but the fact that parliament is the giver of these powers, places 
an onus on them to ensure that these powers when exercised would be to the 
utmost benefit of the society and not to its detriment. 
 
Delegated legislation has been shown to be both legitimate and constitutionally 
desirable.173 Due to the exigencies of modern society, the parliament after laying 
the policy of the legislation, donates some of its law making powers to the 
executive to fill in the details in order to get the kind of laws that society deserves.  
The reasons for this is stated as mainly lack of time on the part of the parliament 
and the exigencies of modern society. Parliament lacks the expertise to legislate 
in details on every aspect of the society and the flexibility with which delegated 
legislation can be used to make laws especially in times of emergency are reasons 
that have been used to justify the delegation of law making power.  
 
However, the role of delegated legislation is to fill in the details after parliament 
has laid the policy in the primary legislation, but we have seen that making a 
distinction between those aspects that should be in the primary Act and those 
details to be left to government has caused its own controversy as government 
have been accused of using these delegated legislation to pull through their 
policies without recourse to the rigors of adequate law making process in the 
parliament. Also regulators tend to exercise these power in a manner that is not 
in line with the primary Act and does not follow the policy and intent of the 
Parliament.  
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Consequently, delegated legislation has been criticised as making the government 
too powerful and contravening the principles of separation of powers. Several 
other criticisms are made against delegated legislation. This is further heightened 
by the fact that there are no adequate measures in Nigeria that will serve as 
safeguard to prevent the exercise of this law making power from harbouring bad 
quality legislation.   
 
Various form of control were analysed such as parliamentary control, judicial 
control and executive control but the contention is that, parliamentary control is 
the most effective of them all though obviously lacking in Nigeria. In carrying 
out this function, the focus of parliament should be on the enabling clause and 
other procedural requirement such as consultation and publication which ought 
to be complied with and to ensure that the regulation is within the line of the 
parent legislation.  
 
Due to the cumbersomeness of the task and their sheer number, parliament has to 
rely on its committee who perform this function and report back to it. Parliament 
has the final authority to stop a delegated legislation that does not fulfil the 
requirement to further the overall objective of the law.  
The dissertation has been able to prove from the given examples that adequate 
parliamentary scrutiny is lacking in Nigeria and that is the reason why the system 
harbours bad quality delegated legislation. Parliament has not been able to 
provide any guidelines for the making of delegated legislation and after these 
powers are exercised, there is no form of scrutiny on it to ensure that it is within 
the limits of the powers conferred.   
 
The analysis also shows that most of the powers that are exercised are not in line 
either with the powers conferred or the general intention of the Act, as such, there 
is need for safeguard. In order to prevent the harbouring of bad quality delegated 
legislation, Parliament should set standards and laydown certain requirement that 
regulators must comply with before delegated legislation can be made. Procedural 
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rules of publication and consultation should be made condition precedent for the 
exercise of this powers. This will go a long way to make regulators cautious   
Consequently, the following recommendations are made: 
I. That draft from proposed instrument as a matter of requirement should be 
laid in parliament and receive approval before they are made. 
II. That provision should be made in the enabling Act for the revocation and 
amendment of instruments that does not comply with the enabling Act. 
III. That laying requirement should be complied with as it serves as a check 
upon the powers that are conferred.174 It invariably raises the interest to 
ensure that adequate scrutiny is given to those measures that are laid before 
it.  
IV. That legislative committees to scrutinise delegated legislation is a system 
that should be transplanted to Nigeria. The importance of this cannot be 
over emphasised as an effective control measure for delegated legislation. 
V. That a general statute be made that will regulate the making of delegated 
legislation.  
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